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A NEW CALL FOR REFORM: SEX ABUSE 
AND THE FOREIGN SOVEREIGN 
IMMUNITIES ACT 
INTRODUCTION 
n 2002, the Catholic Church became embroiled in what has been 
called “a crisis without precedent in our times.”1 That year, more 
than 3,300 allegations of sexual abuse by clergy members surfaced in the 
United States.2 At the time, that figure brought the total number of al-
leged victims since 1950 to 11,750 and contributed to an estimated $840 
million dollars spent by the Catholic Church in legal settlements and 
“other costs related to sex abuse.”3 For the most part, however, the Holy 
See has been insulated from the wave of litigation resulting from these 
astounding statistics as it has rarely been named a co-defendant in U.S. 
lawsuits.4 
On June 7, 2006, the U.S. District Court of Oregon (“Oregon District 
Court”) rendered an unusual decision in the matter of Doe v. Holy See 
when it denied the Holy See’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject mat-
ter jurisdiction.5 The Holy See was named a co-defendant in the com-
plaint, which arose from the alleged sex abuse committed by Father An-
drew Ronan (“Ronan”) against the plaintiff, a minor, during the 1960s.6 
The Oregon District Court found that the Holy See’s conduct fell within 
the tortious activity exception (“tort exception”) of the Foreign Sover-
eign Immunities Act of 1976 (“FSIA”)7 and that the Holy See was there-
fore subject to jurisdiction despite its presumed immunity.8 
                                                                                                             
 1. UNITED STATES CONFERENCE OF CATHOLIC BISHOPS, CHARTER FOR THE 
PROTECTION OF CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE (2005), http://www.usccb.org/ocyp/ 
charter.shtml [hereinafter CHARTER]. 
 2. Alan Cooperman, In 2004, 1000 Alleged Abuse By Priests, WASH. POST, Feb. 19, 
2005, at A02, available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A36324-
2005Feb19.html (correction to the original article). 
 3. Id. The costs continue to increase by staggering amounts. In 2007, the Los Ange-
les Archdiocese settled with sex abuse victims for a record $660 million. See Laurie 
Goodstein, Payout Is Bittersweet for Victims of Abuse, N.Y. TIMES, July 17, 2007, at 
A15, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2007/07/17/us/17abuse.html. 
 4. The instances in which the Holy See has been named a co-defendant are discussed 
infra, Part II. 
 5. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931 (D. Or. 2006). 
 6. Id. at 931. 
 7. Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1602–1611 (1976). The tort 
exception is found at 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5). 
 8. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 931. 
I 
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The FSIA serves as the exclusive vehicle by which to obtain jurisdic-
tion over a foreign sovereign.9 It immunizes a foreign sovereign from 
jurisdiction in U.S. courts except as provided in certain sections of the 
act.10 The Holy See was first recognized as a foreign sovereign by the 
United States in 1984.11 Originally filed in 2002 and amended two years 
later, plaintiff John V. Doe’s complaint asserted three causes of action 
against the Holy See, including negligence,12 respondeat superior,13 and 
fraud.14 
The Oregon District Court concluded that the plaintiff’s allegations 
were “sufficient to establish the applicability of the tortious activity ex-
ception to the FSIA such that plaintiff survives the Holy See’s facial at-
tack in this motion to dismiss.”15 Under Oregon’s “expansive” respon-
deat superior doctrine, it seemed only sensible that the Holy See should 
be subject to liability for the alleged acts of Ronan, its agent.16 As for 
negligence, however, the Oregon District Court was obliged to address 
the fact that some of the Holy See’s alleged conduct did not occur in the 
United States,17 a fact that has typically led courts to determine that the 
FSIA’s tort exception does not apply.18 The language of the tort excep-
                                                                                                             
 9. Id. at 933 (citing Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 541 U.S. 677, 699 (2004)). 
 10. 28 U.S.C. § 1604. 
 11. O’Bryan v. Holy See (O’Bryan I), 490 F. Supp. 2d 826, 829 (W.D. Ky. 2005). 
     12.  According to the Restatement (Second) of Torts:                                                                                                                       
Negligent conduct may be either: (a) an act which the actor as a reasonable man 
should recognize as involving an unreasonable risk of causing an invasion of an 
interest of another, or (b) a failure to do an act which is necessary for the pro-
tection or assistance of another and which the actor is under a duty to do. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 284 (1979). 
 13. “The doctrine holding an employer or principal liable for the employee’s or 
agent’s wrongful acts committed within the scope of the employment or agency.” 
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1338 (8th ed. 2004). 
 14. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 931. According to the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts:  
A misrepresentation is fraudulent if the maker (a) knows or believes that the 
matter is not as he represents it to be, (b) does not have the confidence in the 
accuracy of his representation that he states or implies, or (c) knows that he 
does not have the basis for his representation that he states or implies. 
Restatement (Second) of Torts § 526 (1979). 
 15. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925, 957 (D. Or. 2006). 
 16. Id. at 949. 
 17. Id. at 951–53. 
 18. Joseph W. Dellapenna, Refining the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, 9 
WILLAMETTE J. INT’L L. & DISP. RESOL. 57, 136–37 (2001) (noting that “most courts that 
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tion expressly requires the injury to occur in the United States, but is si-
lent as to the tortious act or omission.19 The confusion with regard to the 
site of the tort has not gone unnoticed by judges or scholars.20 In dealing 
with this issue, the Oregon District Court decided that since the plaintiff 
alleged that at least one entire tort occurred in the United States, the neg-
ligence complaint was sufficient to withstand dismissal.21 
This Note will argue that Doe v. Holy See, although decided correctly, 
exemplifies the unnecessary confusion surrounding the FSIA’s tort ex-
ception. Such confusion must be addressed in view of the wave of clergy 
sex abuse litigation in the United States that is now more likely to name 
the Holy See as a defendant. Part I of this Note will discuss the language 
of the tort exception and how it is typically interpreted in FSIA jurispru-
dence in terms of both legislative history and statutory construction. Part 
II will discuss similar clergy sex abuse cases in which the Holy See was 
named a defendant and the unsuccessful endeavors of plaintiffs to pierce 
its sovereign veil. Part III will discuss in further detail the facts, reason-
ing, and unusual holding of the Oregon District Court in Doe v. Holy See. 
Part IV will argue that the plaintiff-friendly result of Doe v. Holy See, 
though atypical, is proper given the language of the tort exception and 
the FSIA’s stated objective to “serve the interests of justice.”22 Finally, 
Part V will conclude that in the absence of much needed amendment to 
the FSIA’s tort exception, courts should look more favorably upon plain-
tiffs that sue the Holy See for its role in the clergy sex scandal epidemic, 
provided their complaints sufficiently allege tortious conduct occurring 
either at home or abroad with direct effects in the United States. 
I. VARIOUS INTERPRETATIONS OF THE TORT EXCEPTION 
As a general proposition, sovereign immunity of a foreign state is a 
rule, not an exception.23 The FSIA states, “Subject to existing interna-
                                                                                                             
have addressed the issue have held that both the tortious act or omission also must occur 
in the United States”). 
 19. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976). 
 20. See, e.g., Dellapenna, supra note 18, at 137. 
 21. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925, 953 (D. Or. 2006). 
 22. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976). 
 23. 28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) provides: 
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction without regard to amount in 
controversy of any nonjury civil action against a foreign state as defined in sec-
tion 1603(a) of this title as to any claim for relief in personam with respect to 
which the foreign state is not entitled to immunity either under sections 1605-
1607 of this title or under any applicable international agreement.  
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tional agreements to which the United States is a party . . . a foreign state 
shall be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts of the United States  
. . . except as provided in sections 1605–07 of this chapter.”24 One reason 
for the FSIA’s enactment, as discussed by Congress, was to codify the 
“restrictive principle” of sovereign immunity, under which a foreign state 
is subject to jurisdiction in U.S. courts only for its commercial or private 
acts.25 Further, Congress intended this principle to apply in litigation, 
leaving the question of sovereign immunity in the hands of the judiciary 
in order to alleviate pressure on the executive branch with potentially 
adverse consequences for foreign relations.26 This goal is highlighted in 
the FSIA’s declaration of purpose, which states in part: “The Congress 
finds that the determination by United States courts of the claims of for-
eign states to immunity from the jurisdiction of such courts would serve 
the interests of justice and would protect the rights of both foreign states 
and litigants in United States courts.”27 
While these intentions may be clear cut, the FSIA’s substantive provi-
sions are not always so transparent.28 The tort exception, upon which 
Doe v. Holy See was decided,29 is one such provision. FSIA section 
1605(a)(5) provides: 
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of 
the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which money dam-
ages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death, or 
damage to or loss of property, occurring in the United States and 
caused by the tortious act or omission of that foreign state or of any of-
ficial or employee of that foreign state while acting within the scope of 
his office or employment.30 
                                                                                                             
28 U.S.C. § 1330(a) (1976). The same holds true for the Holy See. As the Ore-
gon District Court noted, “The Holy See, a foreign sovereign, is presumptively 
immune from suit under the FSIA unless an exception applies.” Doe v. Holy 
See, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 931. 
 24. 28 U.S.C. § 1604 (1976). 
 25. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 7 (1976). 
 26. Id. (discussing how, prior to enactment of the FSIA, foreign states would “often 
request the Department of State to make a formal suggestion of immunity to the court” 
and possibly “attempt to bring diplomatic influences to bear upon the State Department’s 
determination”). 
 27. 28 U.S.C. § 1602. 
 28. Working Group of the American Bar Association, Report: Reforming the Sover-
eign Immunities Act, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 489, 492 (2002) [hereinafter Working 
Group] (stating that “the structure and language of the [FSIA] have challenged courts”). 
 29. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931 (D. Or. 2006). 
 30. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976). The tort exception is subject to two limitations. 
The provision does not apply to: 
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Among the provision’s noteworthy features is the explicit language 
calling for the injury to occur in the United States while providing no 
geographic requirement as to the tortious act or omission. As the Oregon 
District Court in Doe v. Holy See explained, this is because of the 
“placement of the clause ‘in the United States’ after ‘injury’ but before 
‘caused by act or omission.’”31 This inconsistency has been dealt with 
numerous times by the courts, which generally acknowledge that, on its 
face, the tort exception would allow jurisdiction regardless of where the 
act or omission took place.32 Legislative intent, however, has usually 
swayed courts in favor of the theory that the entire tort, including the act 
or omission, must occur in the United States.33 The House Report appur-
tenant to the FSIA explicitly states as much.34 
Some courts have interpreted the tort exception to require the tortious 
conduct to occur within the United States as a matter of statutory con-
struction based on the language of another FSIA exception to immu-
nity—the commercial activity exception. Found in section 1605(a)(2), 
that provision states: 
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of courts of 
the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which the action is 
based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United States by the 
                                                                                                             
(A) any claim based upon the exercise or performance or the failure to exercise 
or perform a discretionary function regardless of whether the discretion be 
abused, or (B) any claim arising out of malicious prosecution, abuse of process, 
libel, slander, misrepresentation, deceit, or interference with contract rights.  
28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A)-(B). The underlying purpose of 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) is 
“to allow government executives to make policy decisions in an atmosphere free of con-
cern over possible litigation.” Olsen v. Gov’t of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 647 (9th Cir. 
1984). See also Working Group, supra note 28, at 569 (observing that “the more the con-
duct involves the exercise of judgment and the more it appears to be grounded in social, 
economic, or political policy, the more likely courts will find it to be a discretionary func-
tion”). 
 31. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 951. 
 32. See, e.g., Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 379 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (noting that “[a]t first blush, it appears that there is jurisdiction [under the tort 
exception] if the injury . . . occurs in this country, regardless of whether the tortious act 
causing the injury occurred within this nation’s borders”); English v. Thorne, 676 F. 
Supp. 761, 762 (S.D. Miss. 1987) (observing that “the provision is silent as to the situs of 
the alleged tortious conduct”). 
 33. See, e.g., Frolova, 761 F.2d at 379 (stating that “there is explicit legislative his-
tory indicating that Congress intended that the tortious act or omission, as well as the 
injury, occur in the United States”). 
 34. H.R. Rep. 94-1487, at 21 (1976) (stating that “the tortious act or omission must 
occur within the jurisdiction of the United States”). 
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foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in connec-
tion with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon 
an act outside the territory of the United States in connection with a 
commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a 
direct effect in the United States.35 
The construction of this particular provision influenced the Supreme 
Court’s interpretation of the tort exception in Argentine Republic v. Ame-
rada Hess Shipping Corporation.36 
In Amerada Hess, two Liberian corporations sued the Argentine Re-
public in tort for damages sustained by a neutral oil tanker attacked at 
sea.37 The respondents argued that, of the FSIA’s various exceptions to 
immunity,38 the tort exception was “most in point.”39 The Court rejected 
this argument, stating, “[The tort exception] is limited by its terms . . . to 
those cases in which damage or loss of property occurs in the United 
States.”40 In its discussion, the Supreme Court gave credence to Con-
gress’s “primary purpose” behind the provision, which was “to eliminate 
a foreign state’s immunity for traffic accidents and other torts committed 
in the United States, for which liability is imposed under domestic tort 
law.”41 
Further, the Supreme Court opined that the tort exception “covers only 
torts occurring within the United States.”42 Here the Court employed a 
comparison of the commercial activity exception with the tort excep-
tion.43 It observed that, unlike the commercial activity exception, the tort 
exception “makes no mention of ‘territory outside the United States’ or 
of ‘direct effects’ in the United States.”44 Thus the use of “explicit lan-
guage” in one provision but not the other indicates that Congress in-
tended noncommercial torts to be actionable under the FSIA only if the 
                                                                                                             
 35. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2). 
 36. 488 U.S. 428 (1989). 
 37. Id. at 431–32. At the time of the attack, Great Britain and the Argentine Republic 
were at war over the Falkland Islands and the Islas Malvinas, off the Argentine coast. Id. 
at 431. Both countries were informed by the United States of the presence of oil tankers 
and “to avoid any attacks on neutral shipping.” Id. 
 38. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)–(d). 
 39. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 439 (1989). 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. at 439-40. See also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 21 (1976) (stating that “the 
purpose of section 1605(a)(5) is to permit the victim of a traffic accident or other non-
commercial tort to maintain an action against the foreign state to the extent otherwise 
provided by law”). 
 42. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 441. 
 43. Id. 
 44. Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(2)). 
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tort occurred in the United States.45 As Justice Blackmun noted, how-
ever, the question of whether one of the FSIA’s exceptions to immunity 
applied to the case had not been addressed by the Court of Appeals or 
fully briefed by the parties.46 He therefore felt it was inappropriate to 
address the issue at first instance.47 
The Seventh Circuit employed reasoning similar to the Supreme 
Court’s four years earlier in the case of Frolova v. Union of Soviet So-
cialist Republics when it affirmed the district court’s dismissal of the 
plaintiff’s action.48 The absence of language similar to that of the com-
mercial activity exception lent support to the Seventh Circuit’s conclu-
sion that Congress intended both the injury and act or omission to occur 
in the United States.49 In Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, a major-
ity of the District of Columbia Circuit agreed that where Congress uses 
explicit language in one provision of a statute but not in the other, “a 
strong inference arises that the two provisions do not mean the same 
thing.”50 
Other courts and scholars, however, have recognized the problem with 
the foregoing deference to legislative intent, particularly in cases where 
the site of the tortious conduct is not entirely clear.51 The Ninth Circuit 
                                                                                                             
 45. Id. 
 46. Id. at 443. Because the respondent corporations originally attempted to invoke 
jurisdiction under the Alien Tort Statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1350, hence the FSIA was not the 
focus of the district court proceedings, or of the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, which 
reversed the district court’s dismissal of the complaints. Amerada Hess, 488 U.S. at 432–
33. 
 47. Id. at 443 (Blackmun, J., concurring in part). 
 48. Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 1985). 
The plaintiff in Frolova, an American woman, sought an injunction and damages against 
the Soviet Union for its refusal to allow her husband, a Muscovite, to return to the United 
States with her after her Soviet visa expired. Id. at 371. The allegations included mental 
anguish, physical distress, and loss of consortium. Id. 
 49. Id. at 379–80 (stating that “[the commercial activity exception] demonstrates that 
when Congress intended to provide jurisdiction for acts outside this country having an 
effect within our borders, it said so explicitly”). 
 50. Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1984). The 
plaintiff, a United States Marine captured by Iranian militants in Tehran and held hostage 
for fifteen months, sought damages for violations of international law, constitutional law, 
and common law. Id. at 837. His parents, co-plaintiffs in the action, sought damages for 
“mental and emotional injuries suffered by virtue of their son’s confinement.” Id. at 844 
(Edwards, J., dissenting in part and concurring in part). The majority held that, despite its 
plain language, the FSIA’s tort exception requires both the tort and injury to occur in the 
United States. Id. at 842. Therefore the court found it did not have jurisdiction over the 
claims. Id. at 843. 
 51. For further discussion of this issue, and the many other uncertainties found in the 
FSIA, see Dellapenna, supra note 18. 
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was confronted with just such a case in Olsen v. Government of Mex-
ico.52 In Olsen, two children brought a wrongful death action based in 
negligence for the death of their parents, both prisoners, who died in a 
plane crash less than one mile inside the United States.53 The crash vic-
tims were en route from Monterrey to Tijuana, where they were to be 
transferred to American authorities for incarceration in the United 
States.54 Poor weather conditions required maneuvering the plane within 
the airspaces of Mexico and the United States, as well as communication 
between air controllers in Tijuana and San Diego, before the aircraft 
struck a telephone pole and crashed.55 The appellants alleged that “Mex-
ico negligently maintained, directed and piloted the aircraft.”56 Mexico 
challenged the applicability of the tort exception, contending it “must be 
construed to require all of the tortious conduct to occur in the United 
States before a foreign state will be denied immunity.”57 Thus Mexico 
asserted its immunity on the grounds that “some allegedly tortious acts or 
omissions took place outside the United States.”58 
The Ninth Circuit rejected Mexico’s argument, stating that such an in-
terpretation “contradicts the purpose of the FSIA, which is to ‘serve the 
interests of justice and . . . protect the rights of both foreign states and 
litigants in United States courts.’”59 The court reasoned that to adopt 
such a strict situs requirement “would encourage foreign states to allege 
that some tortious conduct occurred outside the United States.”60 Instead 
the court held that jurisdiction is proper under the tort exception where a 
plaintiff alleges that “at least one entire tort” occurred in the United 
States.61 
The Ninth Circuit’s approach is more closely aligned with recent 
scholarship concerning the language of the FSIA. For example, in a 2002 
report, the Working Group of the International Litigation Committee of 
the Section of International Law and Practice of the American Bar Asso-
ciation (“Working Group”) recommended various amendments to the 
FSIA, including the tort exception.62 Given its uncertainties, the Working 
                                                                                                             
 52. Olsen v. Gov’t of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641(9th Cir. 1984). 
 53. Id. at 643–44. 
 54. Id. at 643. 
 55. Id. at 643–44. 
 56. Id. at 647. 
 57. Olsen, 729 F.2d at 646. 
 58. Id. 
 59. Id. (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1602). 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. 
 62. Working Group, supra note 28, at 564–73. The Working Group discussed Olsen 
in support of this proposition. Id. at 567. 
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Group proposed that the tort exception be amended to require a “substan-
tial portion” of the tortious activity to occur in the United States.63 As the 
Working Group noted, however, other “influential” authority, such as the 
American Law Institute’s Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law, 
interprets the tort exception to apply “regardless of where the act or 
omission causing the injury took place.”64 
II. A FORMIDABLE ADVERSARY 
Doe’s complaint against the Holy See was certainly not the first of its 
kind to reach a United States District Court.65 The Holy See, however, 
has most often prevailed against the piercing of its sovereign status.66 
                                                                                                             
 63. Id. at 573. 
 64. Id. at 567 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States § 454 cmt. e (1987)). With regard to tort claims, the Restatement reads like the 
FSIA. It states: 
Under international law, a state is not immune from the jurisdiction of the 
courts of another state with respect to claims in tort for injury to persons or 
property in the state of the forum. 
Courts in the United States may exercise jurisdiction with respect to claims in 
tort against foreign states for injury to persons or property in the United States, 
other than claims based upon an exercise of a discretionary function or claims 
for malicious prosecution, abuse of process, libel, slander, misrepresentation, 
deceit, or interference with contract rights. 
Restatement (Third) Foreign Relations Law § 454. With regard to place of injury, the 
commentary provides: 
Under Section 1605(a)(5) of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, courts in 
the United States have jurisdiction over tort claims against a foreign state only 
if the injury took place in the United States, regardless of where the act or 
omission causing the injury took place. Indirect effects in the United States, 
such as loss of consortium resulting from injury to a claimant’s spouse inflicted 
by the foreign state outside the United States, are not within the jurisdiction of 
courts in the United States under Subsection (2). 
Id. cmt. e. 
 65. See, e.g., English v. Thorne, 676 F. Supp. 761, 762 (S.D. Miss. 1987) 
(“[P]laintiffs seek to impose liability upon the various other defendants, including the 
Vatican, based upon allegations that they negligently employed, retained and reassigned 
[Catholic priest] as pastor of the Holy Ghost Parish of the Catholic Diocese of Jackson  
. . . .”); O’Bryan I, 490 F. Supp. 2d 826, 828 (W.D. Ky. 2005) (noting that plaintiffs’ 
claims against the Holy See, including respondeat superior, infliction of emotional dis-
tress, and negligence, “arise from allegations of sexual abuse by local Catholic priests 
many years ago”). 
 66. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925, 933 (D. Or. 2006) (noting that in this case 
“the sovereign status of the Holy See is not in dispute”). See also John L. Allen, Jr., U.S. 
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The results of prior clergy sex abuse cases—both state and federal—are 
indicative of the difficulties involved in suing the Holy See. In Doe v. 
O’Connell, for example, the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern 
District affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiff’s claims against all defen-
dants on statute of limitations grounds,67 while the claims against co-
defendant Holy See had already been dismissed for failure to prosecute.68 
In the New York case of Doe v. Holy See (State of Vatican City), the 
plaintiff’s claims were similarly dismissed on statute of limitations 
grounds, and also for jurisdictional reasons, “even absent a motion from 
[the Holy See].”69 The O’Connell and State of Vatican City opinions 
were not specific as to why the Holy See should escape liability. The 
1987 case of English v. Thorne, however, clearly turned on the FSIA 
with regard to both service of process and the tort exception.70 
In English, the Holy See based its motion to dismiss upon insufficiency 
of process, lack of personal jurisdiction and lack of subject matter juris-
diction.71 The plaintiffs acknowledged that service of process was defec-
tive and requested leave to correct it.72 The court could have granted such 
                                                                                                             
Court Oks Legal Action Against The Holy See, NAT’L CATHOLIC REPORTER, June 16, 
2006, http://nationalcatholicreporter.org/word/word061606.htm#five (stating that “[t]o 
date, the wall of sovereign immunity in American courts has held up where the Vatican is 
concerned”). 
 67. Doe v. O’Connell, 146 S.W.3d 1, 2 (E.D. Mo. 2004) (per curiam). 
 68. Id. at 2 n.1. The complaint in O’Connell arose from the alleged sex abuse of the 
plaintiff by Father O’Connell, which began in the 1960s when plaintiff, then a minor, was 
a seminary student. Id. at 3. The opinion is silent as to how or why the plaintiff failed to 
prosecute the Holy See. 
 69. Doe v. Holy See (State of Vatican City), 793 N.Y.S.2d 565, 567 n.1 (N.Y. App. 
Div. 2005), leave to appeal denied, 845 N.E.2d 1274 (N.Y. 2006). The four consolidated 
matters in this case asserted various causes of action stemming from clergy sex abuse 
occurring as far back as fifty years. Id. at 793–94. The opinion is silent as to what “juris-
dictional grounds” the New York Supreme Court invoked when it ordered dismissal of 
the complaint against co-defendant Holy See, and on appeal the plaintiffs apparently did 
not assert a substantive argument regarding that dismissal. Id. at 794 n.1. For purposes of 
this Note, the terms “Holy See,” “Vatican,” or “Vatican City” may be used interchangea-
bly, as seen in the name of this case. For a detailed analysis of those entities and their 
international status, see Matthew N. Bathon, The Atypical International Status of the 
Holy See, 34 VAND. J. TRANSNAT’L L. 597 (2001). 
 70. English v. Thorne, 676 F. Supp. 761 (S.D. Miss. 1987). The plaintiffs alleged 
tortious conduct of a Catholic priest during his service at the Holy Ghost Parish in Jack-
son, Mississippi. Id. at 762. The complaint against co-defendant Holy See alleged negli-
gent employment, retention, and reassignment of the priest to the parish. Id. 
 71. Id. at 762. 
 72. Id. The plaintiffs attempted to effect service under Mississippi statutes, rather than 
under the FSIA as required. Id. at 762 n.1. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1608 (1976). 
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a request,73 but instead dismissed the complaint in its entirety for lack of 
subject matter jurisdiction.74 The court found two major problems with 
the complaint, both arising from the FSIA’s tort exception.75 First, the 
English court found that the complaint challenged “the policies and/or 
procedures utilized by the Vatican in instructing or ordaining its priests, 
matters which are undeniably of a policy-making nature and clearly dis-
cretionary functions.”76 Thus the court held that the complaint was barred 
by the FSIA’s discretionary function limitation.77 Second, the English 
court determined that “the alleged acts or omissions by the Vatican 
would not have occurred within the jurisdiction of the United States, but 
rather within the confines of the Vatican.”78 In analyzing the FSIA’s tort 
exception, the court favored the legislative history of the provision and, 
like numerous courts before it, concluded that in addition to the injury, 
“the conduct complained of must also have occurred in the United 
States.”79 
The Kentucky case of O’Bryan v. Holy See makes for an interesting 
look at the foregoing issues given that thus far two opinions have been 
published in the case—one prior to the Oregon District Court’s decision 
in Doe v. Holy See,80 and one after.81 In O’Bryan I, the first class action 
suit in which the Holy See was named as the sole defendant for clergy 
sex abuse,82 the plaintiffs failed to effect proper service upon the Holy 
See pursuant to the stringent requirements of the FSIA.83 Though the 
court noted that “the Holy See’s sovereign status does not guarantee its 
immunity from suit,”84 it also emphasized the importance of “strict com-
pliance” with the FSIA’s provisions regarding service of process.85 The 
                                                                                                             
 73. English, 676 F. Supp. at 762. 
 74. Id. The cause of action was dismissed as to all defendants because the plaintiffs 
based subject matter jurisdiction solely on 28 U.S.C. § 1330, a provision under which the 
court found jurisdiction did not exist. English, 676 F. Supp. at 764. 
 75. Id. at 763–64. 
 76. Id. at 764. 
 77. Id. at 763-64. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (1976). 
 78. English, 676 F. Supp. at 764. 
 79. Id. 
 80. See O’Bryan I, 490 F. Supp. 2d 826 (W.D. Ky. 2005). 
 81. O’Bryan v. Holy See (O’Bryan II), 471 F. Supp. 2d 784 (W.D. Ky. 2007). 
 82. Peter Smith & Andrew Wolfson, Louisville Attorney Sues the Vatican, COURIER-
J., June 6, 2004, available at http://www.courtroomlaw.com/news_vatican.shtml. 
 83. O’Bryan I, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 832. 
 84. Id. at 830 n.1. 
 85. Id. at 831. With regard to service of process, the FSIA provides in part: 
Service in the courts of the United States and of the States shall be made upon a 
foreign state or political subdivision of a foreign state: (1) by delivery of a copy 
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plaintiffs were granted sixty days to perfect service,86 which is apparently 
a difficult task given that they made several prior (and unsuccessful) at-
tempts to do so,87 and the Holy See was hardly an amenable defendant.88 
In O’Bryan II, much like in Doe v. Holy See,89 the Holy See challenged 
the court’s subject matter jurisdiction under the FSIA.90 Thus the court 
was compelled to undertake a similar analysis of the FSIA as applied to 
employees of the Holy See and the Holy See itself.91 With regard to the 
duties allegedly breached by the Holy See’s agents, the court concluded 
these “squarely fall under the tortious activity exception of FSIA” given 
                                                                                                             
of the summons and complaint in accordance with any special arrangement for 
service between the plaintiff and the foreign state or political subdivision; or (2) 
if no special arrangement exists, by delivery of a copy of the summons and 
complaint in accordance with an applicable international convention on service 
of judicial documents; or (3) if service cannot be made under paragraphs (1) or 
(2), by sending a copy of the summons and complaint and a notice of suit, to-
gether with a translation of each into the official language of the foreign state, 
by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed and dispatched 
by the clerk of the court to the head of the ministry of foreign affairs of the for-
eign state concerned, or (4) if service cannot be made within 30 days under 
paragraph (3), by sending two copies of the summons and complaint and a no-
tice of suit, together with a translation of each into the official language of the 
foreign state, by any form of mail requiring a signed receipt, to be addressed 
and dispatched by the clerk of the court to the Secretary of State in Washing-
ton, District of Columbia, to the attention of the Director of Special Consular 
Services—and the Secretary shall transmit one copy of the papers through dip-
lomatic channels to the foreign state and shall send to the clerk of the court a 
certified copy of the diplomatic note indicating when the papers were transmit-
ted.  
28 U.S.C. § 1608(a) (1976). 
 86. O’Bryan I, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 832. 
 87. Id. at 832. Ultimately the court found that plaintiffs failed to properly comply 
with 28 U.S.C. § 1608(a)(3), supra note 85, because they addressed the summons and 
complaint to the Head of the Secretariat of State, rather than the Foreign Minister. 
O’Bryan I, 490 F. Supp. 2d at 832. 
 88. Id. at 831 (noting that “compliance is admittedly difficult and is made more so by 
the absence of any accommodation from the Holy See”). 
 89. See Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931 (D. Or. 2006). 
 90. O’Bryan II, 471 F. Supp. 2d 784, 786 (W.D. Ky. 2007). 
 91. Plaintiffs alleged that certain torts were committed “by and through [the Holy 
See’s] agents, servants and employees.” Id. at 786. These included breaches of the duty to 
provide safe care to minors, the duty to warn parents and the duty “to report known or 
suspected perpetrators of childhood sex abuse to the appropriate authorities.” Id. Plain-
tiffs also alleged torts of deceit and misrepresentation against the Holy See itself, as an 
“incorporated association and head of an international religious organization.” Id. at 786–
87. 
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that both the acts and the injuries occurred in the United States.92 As for 
the torts alleged directly against the Holy See, however, the court was 
unwilling to assert jurisdiction. To hold otherwise, it stated, “would con-
stitute a dramatic expansion of FSIA” given that the Holy See’s alleged 
deceit and misrepresentation occurred outside the United States.93 More-
over, not all of the claims that fell within the tort exception survived due 
to other FSIA intricacies. For example, the court held that the FSIA’s 
discretionary function limitation94 barred the claim that the Holy See 
(through its agents) failed to provide safe care to children.95 
Ultimately, several of the O’Bryan II claims withstood the Holy See’s 
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. These included 
“negligent failure to report, negligent failure to warn . . . outrage and 
emotional distress, violations of the customary law of human rights, and 
claims under the doctrine of respondeat superior.”96 These victories, 
however, came with a limitation. The court remained willing to recon-
sider the question of whether the individual actors accused of tortious 
conduct (the “United States-based bishops, archbishops and other clergy 
of the Roman Catholic Church”) are actually “employees” or “officials” 
of the Holy See pursuant to the FSIA.97 While the plaintiffs did make a 
prima facie showing that the Holy See exercised “substantial control” 
over these actors, the FSIA does not define the terms “employee” or “of-
ficial.”98 Thus, at the writing of this Note, the Holy See remains free to 
present evidence that these actors were not acting within the scope of 
their employment, and this would “require the court to revisit [its] con-
clusions and refine the precise acts or omissions subject to jurisdiction 
under FSIA.”99 In other words, the court has left the Holy See with yet 
another mechanism for challenging jurisdiction. 
III. DOE V. HOLY SEE—AN ATYPICAL RESULT 
The matter of Doe v. Holy See arose from the alleged sexual abuse the 
plaintiff suffered at the hands of Father Andrew Ronan, a Catholic priest 
assigned to St. Albert’s Church in Portland around 1965, when the plain-
                                                                                                             
 92. Id. at 790. 
 93. Id. 
 94. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (1976). 
 95. O’Bryan II, 471 F. Supp. 2d at 793. 
 96. Id. at 795. 
 97. Id. 
 98. Id. at 791 (noting that whether one is an employee of the Holy See is a question of 
Kentucky law). 
 99. Id. at 792. 
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tiff was fifteen or sixteen years old.100 Among the plaintiff’s numerous 
assertions was that, “[d]espite knowing of Ronan’s dangerous propensi-
ties to abuse children, the Holy See placed Ronan in defendant Archdio-
cese in Portland, Oregon.”101 Further, the complaint alleged that when 
the “repeated occasions” of sexual abuse occurred, “plaintiff was under 
the authority and influence of Ronan as a Roman Catholic priest which 
authority was granted to him by Defendant Holy See, Archdiocese and 
Order.”102 
The Holy See’s motion to dismiss presented a facial attack against the 
complaint.103 That is, it did not dispute the plaintiff’s factual allegations, 
but rather asserted that the complaint on its face was insufficient to in-
voke federal jurisdiction.104 In such a situation, “the court must accept as 
true the factual allegations in plaintiff’s complaint.”105 
The plaintiff did not dispute the sovereign status of the Holy See, but 
argued that subject matter jurisdiction was nonetheless proper under both 
the FSIA’s commercial activity exception and the tort exception.106 The 
commercial activity theory was based on the fact that the Holy See over-
sees and participates in “providing religious and pastoral guidance, edu-
cation and counseling services to Roman Catholics world-wide in ex-
change for all or a portion of the revenues derived from its members for 
these services.”107 Ronan, acting as the Holy See’s agent, helped obtain 
such financial support during the course of his agency.108 The Oregon 
District Court commented that the commercial activity exception, as ap-
plied to the facts of the case, was a “novel and close” issue.109 Ulti-
                                                                                                             
 100. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925, 931 (D. Or. 2006). 
 101. Id. at 932 (citing Complaint at ¶ 13, Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925 (D. Or. 
2006) (No. CV 02-430-MO). See also Complaint at ¶¶ 11–12, Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. 
Supp. 2d 925 (D. Or. 2006) (No. CV 02-430-MO) (discussing Ronan’s prior admissions, 
documented in the records of the Roman Catholic Church, to molesting youth in Ireland 
and Chicago prior to his placement in Portland). 
 102. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 932 (citing Complaint at ¶¶ 15, 36, Doe v. 
Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925 (D. Or. 2006) (No. CV 02-430-MO)). The Archdiocese of 
Portland (“Archdiocese”) and the Order of Friar Servants (“Order”) were named as co-
defendants for their role in the alleged sexual abuse by Ronan. See id. at 931. 
 103. Id. at 932–33. 
 104. Id. at 932. 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id. at 933. 
 107. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 940 (citing Complaint at ¶ 3, Doe v. Holy 
See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925 (D. Or. 2006) (No. CV 02-430-MO)) (emphasis omitted). 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 942. 
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mately, however, the plaintiff could not persuade the Oregon District 
Court that subject matter jurisdiction existed under that exception.110 
The plaintiff’s argument that the Holy See was subject to jurisdiction 
under the tort exception was more successful, at least with regard to the 
claims of respondeat superior and negligence liability.111 As to the for-
mer claim, the Holy See argued that the plaintiff failed to allege, per the 
language of the tort exception, that Ronan was “an employee acting 
within the scope of his employment.”112 The Oregon District Court dis-
agreed.113 First, the Oregon District Court found that the plaintiff suffi-
ciently alleged Ronan was an employee of the Holy See given that the 
Holy See had the right to control Ronan, “furnished Ronan with facilities 
. . . to perform his duties,” and was responsible for disciplining its 
priests.114 Further, the Oregon District Court found sufficient allegations 
that Ronan acted within the scope of his employment.115 Specifically, the 
allegations that Ronan “sought and gained” the plaintiff’s trust, procured 
his participation in “counseling and other activities,” and did so out of 
motivation to serve the Holy See, were all relevant to a determination 
that Ronan’s conduct preceding the sexual abuse was within the scope of 
his employment.116 Based on the foregoing, the Oregon District Court 
found “sufficient grounds upon which to hold [the Holy See] liable under 
a theory of respondeat superior.”117 
In moving to dismiss the negligence claim, the Holy See argued that 
the FSIA’s discretionary function limitation118 shielded it from jurisdic-
tion and that the plaintiff failed to allege that the entire tort occurred in 
the United States.119 Given the leading tort exception jurisprudence, and 
                                                                                                             
 110. Id. In its analysis, the Oregon District Court observed that “[t]he true essence of 
plaintiff’s complaint is an allegation of sexual abuse committed by a parish priest. The 
gravamen of the complaint does not appear to be commercial in nature.” Id. at 940. 
 111. Id. at 947–53. The plaintiff’s cause of action for fraud was based on the notion 
that the Holy See misrepresented Ronan as a “fit and competent agent of the Holy See 
and a minister of Christ.” Id. at 932, 945 (citing Pl.’s Compl. ¶ 35). The plaintiff, how-
ever, conceded that the fraud claim was likely barred by 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B), the 
“misrepresentation exception.” Id. at 947. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(B) (1976). 
 112. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 948. 
 113. Id. at 950. 
 114. Id. at 949. Under Oregon law, these factors are among those considered by courts 
to establish employee status. Id. 
 115. Id. at 950. 
 116. Id. Additionally, these were the type of acts that Ronan was hired to perform, 
another relevant factor under Oregon’s “expansive theory” of scope of employment. Id. at 
949–50. 
 117. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 950. 
 118. 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)(A) (1976). 
 119. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 950. 
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the outcome of English v. Thorne, these were not novel arguments.120 
The Oregon District Court’s decision, however, was not typical given the 
defendant-friendly stance most courts have taken on the issue.121 
The Holy See failed to persuade the Oregon District Court that its al-
leged conduct fell within the FSIA’s discretionary function limitation.122 
As the Oregon District Court observed, Doe’s complaint alleged more 
than just “negligent hiring or supervision,” allegations which would have 
been sufficient to invoke immunity under the discretionary function limi-
tation.123 Here the complaint detailed Ronan’s propensity for child mo-
lestation and how the Holy See knew (or should have known) of such 
propensity when it placed him in the Portland archdiocese without warn-
ing parishioners.124 The Oregon District Court concluded that these acts 
or omissions, particularly the Holy See’s failure to warn parishioners, 
were not “based on plausible policy considerations for which the Holy 
See is entitled to immunity under the discretionary function excep-
tion.”125 
The Holy See also argued that the negligence claim should be dis-
missed for the plaintiff’s failure to show that the “entire tort occurred ‘in 
the United States.’”126 In so arguing, the Holy See relied on Amerada 
Hess for support that “the tort exception is inapplicable unless the Holy 
See’s alleged acts or omissions occurred entirely within the United 
States.”127 The Holy See theorized that the tort exception did not apply 
under these facts given that the plaintiff’s allegations included tortious 
conduct occurring in Rome.128 However, as the Oregon District Court 
                                                                                                             
 120. See supra text accompanying notes 71–76. 
 121. Id. 
 122. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 957. 
 123. Id. at 954 (rejecting the Holy See’s “rather generic characterization of the plain-
tiff’s allegations”). 
 124. Id. at 954–55. According to the complaint, the factual allegations of which went 
undisputed, Ronan sexually molested a minor in Ireland in the 1950s prior to his place-
ment in Chicago in the private counseling office of St. Philip’s High School. Id. at 931. 
There he admitted to abusing three male students and “expressed confusion as to why he 
would be assigned to work in the private counseling office where temptation to molest 
children would be maximized.” Id. He was then placed in Portland. Id. 
 125. Id. at 956. This conclusion, apart from being surprisingly favorable to the plain-
tiff, also demonstrates the importance of detailed pleadings. Compare id. (discussing how 
plaintiff’s complaint “adequately alleges” conduct that the discretionary function excep-
tion was not “designed to shield”), with English, 676 F. Supp. 761, 763 (S.D. Miss. 1987) 
(stating that “[t]he complaint contains nothing more than general allegations” with regard 
to defendants’ negligence). 
 126. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 950 (quoting 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5)). 
 127. Id. at 952. 
 128. Id. 
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observed, “Amerada Hess does not require this result.”129 This observa-
tion is correct. In Amerada Hess, the injury itself occurred outside of the 
United States and therefore the tort clearly did not fall within the excep-
tion.130 Thus the Supreme Court did not delve into the issue of whether 
the tortious act or omission also needed to occur entirely within the 
United States—that analysis was done largely in dictum.131 
Plaintiff Doe, on the other hand, advanced a plain reading of the tor-
tious activity exception to argue that only the injury, not the act or omis-
sion, needs to occur in the United States.132 Although this particular read-
ing of the provision has been consistently rejected in FSIA jurispru-
dence,133 the fact remains that the language of the act does not expressly 
require the tortious act or omission to occur on U.S. soil.134 
For guidance on the situs issue, the Oregon District Court looked to the 
Ninth Circuit’s “middle ground” interpretation in Olsen.135 It noted that 
Doe’s complaint contained allegations of negligent acts (such as placing 
Ronan in Portland) as well as omissions (such as failure to warn).136 To 
comport with Olsen, the Oregon District Court would have to evaluate 
whether at least one of these occurred entirely within the United 
States.137 As the opinion observed, “it is difficult to pinpoint the site of 
an omission.”138 Thus the Oregon District Court focused its analysis on 
the Holy See’s actions that were “easier to locate.”139 
Apparently the easiest negligent act to locate was the Holy See’s trans-
fer of Ronan from Chicago to Portland, even though it allegedly “knew 
or should have known of Ronan’s dangerous propensities.”140 The Ore-
gon District Court reasoned that since this transfer “occurred entirely 
                                                                                                             
 129. Id. 
 130. Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 428, 440 (1989). 
 131. Id. at 441. 
 132. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 951. 
 133. See, e.g., Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 379 (7th 
Cir. 1985) (stating that “[a]t least one district court has read [the tort exception] this 
broadly, but this interpretation has been rejected by the Court of Appeals for that circuit, 
and by every other court that has considered the issue”) (internal citations omitted). 
 134. See 28 U.S.C. § 1605(a)(5) (1976). 
 135. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 951. See also supra text accompanying notes 
59–61. 
 136. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 952–53. 
 137. Id. at 953. 
 138. Id. The Oregon District Court recognized the dual argument that “the Holy See’s 
failures could be said to have occurred inside the Vatican . . . . On the other hand, it is 
also possible to situate a failure to warn at the location where such warning would have 
been heard—Portland, Oregon.” Id. 
 139. Id. 
 140. Id. 
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within the United States,” and since the plaintiff’s injuries thereafter 
clearly occurred in the United States, the claim for negligence was le-
gitimately based on “acts and injuries occurring entirely in the United 
States.”141 The court used Olsen here in support of the theory that the 
negligence claim was viable in spite of the plaintiff having alleged 
“many other bases of tortious conduct . . . possibly occurring outside the 
United States.”142 Although the Oregon District Court did not explicitly 
do so, perhaps one could analogize that Ronan was like the negligent 
pilot in Olsen in the sense that he was under control both at home (by  
the local archdiocese) and abroad (by the Holy See) before scandal 
erupted.143 
The analogy, however, is not completely cohesive given that the Holy 
See’s negligence, despite the Oregon District Court’s reasoning, cannot 
logically be placed within the confines of the United States. The author-
ity to make such a transfer was most likely granted from within the con-
fines of the Holy See, despite the wording of the plaintiff’s complaint 
that the Holy See literally placed Ronan in Portland.144 Perhaps the Holy 
See could have prevailed on its motion had it attacked the factual truth of 
this statement rather than launching only a facial attack as it chose to 
do.145 Given that the Oregon District Court was bound to accept the facts 
as true,146 however, its decision to deny the Holy See’s motion was 
sound. 
IV. CLERGY SEX ABUSE AND THE NEED FOR LEGISLATIVE CHANGE 
The Doe v. Holy See decision exemplifies the confusion courts face 
when interpreting the FSIA’s tort exception in cases where only some (if 
any) of the tortious act or omission occurs in the United States. In the 
wake of the new phenomenon of clergy sex abuse litigation,147 the debate 
over the FSIA’s tort exception is an issue with which courts will continue 
to grapple until the matter is resolved once and for all by Congress. 
Meanwhile, to serve the interests of justice, as Congress intended with 
                                                                                                             
 141. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 953. 
 142. Id. 
 143. See Olsen v. Gov’t of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641, 644 (9th Cir. 1984). See also supra 
text accompanying notes 52–61. 
 144. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d at 952–53. 
 145. Id. at 932. 
 146. Id. at 931. 
 147. Although many sex abuse complaints involving the Catholic Church allege con-
duct occurring well before the enactment of the FSIA, the Author has not found a case 
prior to 1987 in which the Holy See was named a co-defendant for its role in the abuse. 
See English v. Thorne, 676 F. Supp. 761 (S.D. Miss. 1987). 
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the FSIA,148 courts determining the Holy See’s immunity for its role in 
U.S. sex abuse cases should pay greater credence to the plain meaning of 
the tort exception. Otherwise the Holy See’s liability will depend on 
which case law a particular jurisdiction chooses to follow when deciding 
the issue, thereby creating inconsistent and potentially unjust decisions. 
In his article Refining the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act, Joseph 
Dellapenna, an international law scholar and a member of the Working 
Group, cites the tort exception as an example of one of the difficulties 
“judges have bemoaned” when interpreting the “poorly drafted” FSIA.149 
Further, as the Working Group has stated, “Despite the substantial case 
authority, there are reasons for questioning the conclusion that the non-
commercial tort exception, as currently drafted, requires the tortious act 
or omission to occur in the United States.”150 The Working Group has 
also observed that the tort exception’s legislative history, upon which 
courts have often relied, is more ambiguous than it seems given Con-
gress’s remark that the tort “must occur within the jurisdiction of the 
United States.”151 “Jurisdiction,” as the Working Group has noted, is not 
synonymous with “territory.”152 Dellapenna has asserted that foreclosing 
jurisdiction on the grounds that only part of the tortious conduct took 
place outside the United States is “hardly likely to have been what Con-
gress meant in [the tort exception].”153 
The Working Group has also questioned the role of legislative history 
as a dispositive factor in FSIA jurisprudence. The Working Group’s re-
port noted that the Supreme Court “has not yet squarely addressed the 
issue.”154 Meanwhile, “some of [the Supreme Court’s] current members 
place substantial weight on plain language and tend to look skeptically 
                                                                                                             
 148. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976). 
 149. Dellapenna, supra note 18, at 60. 
 150. Working Group, supra note 28, at 566. 
 151. Id. (emphasis added). See also H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 21 (1976). 
 152. Working Group, supra note 28, at 566. Jurisdiction: “A government’s general 
power to exercise authority over all persons and things within its territory; esp., a state’s 
power to create interests that will be recognized under common-law principles as valid in 
other states.” BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 867 (8th ed. 2004). Territory: “A geographical 
area included within a particular government’s jurisdiction; the portion of the earth’s 
surface that is in a state’s exclusive possession and control. Id. at 1512. 
 153. Dellapenna, supra note 18, at 137. 
 154. Working Group, supra note 28, at 566. Presumably the Working Group’s asser-
tion here is in reference to Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 
428 (1989), and the fact that much of the Supreme Court’s opinion regarding the situs of 
the tortious conduct is dictum, given that the plaintiff’s injury in that case occurred out-
side the United States and clearly precluded jurisdiction over the foreign state. See supra 
text accompanying notes 127–31. 
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on the use of legislative history.”155 This approach was also taken by Cir-
cuit Judge Edwards in his Persinger dissent.156 To him, the language of 
the tort exception was not ambiguous at all and therefore he saw “no rea-
son to resort to the legislative history to clarify the plain language of the 
statute.”157 The simple fact that Congress did not enact the same lan-
guage used in the House Report was enough to convince the dissenting 
judge that the plaintiff’s claims, and those of his parents, fell within the 
tort exception and should have withstood dismissal.158 
Granted, when the Persinger decision came down in the District of Co-
lumbia, the Seventh Circuit had yet to hand down its opinion in Frolova, 
a case clearly guided by legislative history.159 In Frolova, however, the 
court rejected another proposition grounded in the legislative history of 
the FSIA.160 The district court had dismissed the plaintiff’s claims sua 
sponte.161 The Soviet Union itself did not file its own motion to dismiss 
because it did not appear in the action.162 The FSIA House Report states 
that “sovereign immunity is an affirmative defense which must be spe-
cially pleaded.”163 Had the court adopted this theory, the plaintiff’s com-
plaint might not have been dismissed absent a responsive pleading from 
the Soviet Union raising the defense. Instead, the court stated that this 
portion of the FSIA’s legislative history “is not entirely accurate,” and 
that “the question of immunity must be considered by a district court 
even though the foreign country . . . has not entered an appearance.”164 
Therefore, despite its semblance of deference to Congressional intent, the 
Seventh Circuit was nonetheless selective as to which portions of the 
FSIA’s legislative history had merit. 
                                                                                                             
 155. Working Group, supra note 28, at 566. 
 156. Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 843 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (Ed-
wards, J., dissenting). 
 157. Id. at 844 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
 158. Id. 
 159. The majority in Persinger cited the Frolova case while it was still at the district 
court level. See Persinger, 729 F.2d at 842 (citing Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist 
Republics, 558 F. Supp. 358 (N.D. Ill. 1983)). At the time, as Judge Edwards noted, the 
majority’s discussion of the FSIA was “pure dictum.” Id. at 844 (Edwards, J., dissenting). 
See also Frolova v. Union of Soviet Socialist Republics, 761 F.2d 370, 372 (7th Cir. 
1985) (noting that the lower court “discussed, but did not decide, whether the Soviet Un-
ion was immune from suit under the [FSIA]”). 
 160. Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373. 
 161. Id. at 371. 
 162. Id. at 371 n.1. 
 163. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 17 (1976). 
 164. Frolova, 761 F.2d at 373. 
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In light of Doe v. Holy See, and the plaintiff’s initial success in with-
standing the motion to dismiss, there are undoubtedly many lawsuits yet 
to come in which the Holy See will be named a defendant. Given this 
prospect, consistency, not selectivity, should be a common goal among 
courts that must decide whether the tort exception permits claims involv-
ing tortious activity in multiple countries (as in Olsen)165 or bars them (as 
in English).166 Such consistency will not only aid courts presented with 
clergy sex abuse claims, but also those addressing sovereign immunity in 
cases pending in different districts that involve common questions of 
fact.167 
V. BENEFITS OF A PLAINTIFF-FRIENDLY APPROACH 
Lawsuits involving sex abuse by members of the Roman Catholic 
clergy have become commonplace in recent U.S. history.168 Among the 
archdioceses contributing to the astounding settlement figures are Los 
Angeles ($660 million)169 and Boston (over $100 million).170 The Arch-
diocese of Portland, a co-defendant in Doe v. Holy See, recently ended 
bankruptcy proceedings with a $75 million settlement.171 The enormous 
settlements between these archdioceses and sex abuse plaintiffs begs the 
question of why plaintiffs would include the Holy See as a defendant at 
all given the general lack of success in piercing its immunity. In other 
words, why complicate a lawsuit with the inclusion of a foreign sover-
                                                                                                             
 165. Olsen v. Gov’t of Mexico, 729 F.2d 641 (9th Cir.1984). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 59–61. 
 166. English v. Thorne, 676 F. Supp. 761 (S.D. Miss. 1987). See supra text accompa-
nying notes 78–79. 
 167. See, e.g., Notice of Pendency of Other Action or Proceeding, Alperin v. Vatican 
Bank, No. C99-4941MMC (N.D. Cal. June 25, 2002), available at http://www. 
vaticanbankclaims.com/plaintiffs.pdf. Plaintiffs’ attorneys filed this document calling for 
coordination of pretrial matters pertaining to multi-district litigation in which the sover-
eign immunity of the Holy See was “an issue of first importance.” Id. at 5–6. The docu-
ment suggested that lawsuits naming the Holy See as a defendant, including pending 
sexual abuse cases, should be coordinated to “avoid divergent findings on the issue of 
Vatican amenability to suit in the United States.” Id. at 7. See also 28 U.S.C. § 1407(a) 
(1968). 
 168. See supra text accompanying notes 2–3. 
 169. Goodstein, supra note 3. 
 170. Katie Zezima, In Boston, Church Leaders Offer Atonement for Abuse, N.Y. 
TIMES, May 30, 2006, at A14, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2006/05/30/us/ 
30religion.html. 
 171. Ed Langlois & Robert Pfohman, Portland Archdiocese Ends Bankruptcy With $75 
Million Settlement, CATHOLIC NEWS SERVICE, http://www.catholicnews.com/data/ 
stories/cns/0702198.htm. 
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eign when the local culprits are both more accessible and willing to set-
tle? 
One explanation is that suing the Holy See will serve as a wake-up call 
for the Catholic Church to address the sex scandal epidemic from the 
root up. William McMurry, a lead attorney in O’Bryan, stated, “This 
won’t be over until the party who is directly accountable is brought to 
justice, and in my opinion that’s the Holy See.”172 And, as plaintiff James 
O’Bryan stated, “I would just like to see the Catholic Church 
changed.”173 
A recent measure taken by Pope Benedict XVI (the “Pope”) suggests 
that the Holy See feels a similar urgency to quell the clergy sex abuse 
scandal. In 2005, the Pope was named as an individual defendant in the 
case of Doe v. Roman Catholic Diocese of Galveston-Houston.174 The 
complaint, which arose from the alleged sexual abuse of three minors by 
a local priest, included conspiracy to commit sexual assault, fraudulent 
concealment, and negligence.175 In that case, the U.S. Government filed a 
suggestion of immunity on behalf of the Pope, asking the Southern Dis-
trict of Texas to dismiss the suit against him “on the basis of head-of-
state immunity.”176 Consequently, the court granted the Pope’s motion to 
dismiss with prejudice.177 
Just months prior to the decision, however, the Pope approved and or-
dered publication of an Instruction that affirmed the Catholic Church’s 
view that homosexual acts are “intrinsically immoral and contrary to the 
natural law.”178 Therefore, the document says, the Church “cannot admit 
to the seminary or to holy orders those who practise homosexuality, pre-
sent deep-seated homosexual tendencies or support the so-called ‘gay 
                                                                                                             
 172. John L. Allen, Jr., Vatican Asks Rice For Help In Sex Abuse Lawsuit, NAT’L 
CATHOLIC REPORTER, Mar. 11, 2005, available at http://natcath.org/NCR_Online 
/archives2/2005a/031105/031105h.php. 
 173. Smith & Wolfson, supra note 82. 
 174. 408 F. Supp. 2d 272 (S.D. Tex. 2005). 
 175. Id. at 273.  
 176. Id. at 279. The court also noted a distinction between the immunity of foreign 
states and heads of state, stating, “Although the absolute immunity of foreign states has 
been affected by case law and by passage of the [FSIA], the State Department retains the 
authority to assert immunity for diplomatic personnel, including foreign heads of state.” 
Id. at 278. 
 177. Id. at 282. 
 178. Congregation for Catholic Education, Instruction Concerning the Criteria for the 
Discernment of Vocations With Regard to Persons With Homosexual Tendencies In View 
of Their Admission to The Seminary And To Holy Orders (Nov. 4, 2005) [hereinafter 
Congregation], available at http://www.vatican.va/roman_curia/congregations/ccatheduc/ 
documents/rc_con_ccatheduc_doc_20051104_istruzione_en.html. 
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culture.’”179 The timing of the Instruction was hardly coincidental given 
the pressure on the Holy See to address the “sex abuse scandal that 
rocked the church in the United States.”180 The fact that the Pope hap-
pened to be defending himself in a U.S. District Court at the time of the 
Instruction’s release further supports the inference that the Holy See and 
its officials were feeling pressure from sex abuse plaintiffs.181 Regardless 
of the controversial nature of such a document,182 it nonetheless indicates 
that the movement of sex abuse lawsuits onto a global stage has struck a 
chord at the very seat of Catholicism. 
The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops (“Bishops”) took a 
similar stance in 2006, when it issued a document entitled Ministry to 
Persons with a Homosexual Inclination: Guidelines for Pastoral Care.183 
The document likewise affirmed the Catholic view that “homosexual acts 
cannot fulfill the natural ends of human sexuality”184 and that “the 
Church has a right to deny roles of service to those whose behavior vio-
lates her teaching.”185 The document immediately followed news that the 
Bishops voted to spend $335,000 to help fund research on the “causes 
and context” of clergy sex abuse.186 
As with the Pope, the timing of the Bishops’ endeavors is again illus-
trative of the Catholic Church’s scramble to atone for the devastating 
sexual misconduct of its clergy. In 2005, the Bishops issued a revision of 
                                                                                                             
 179. Id. 
 180. Delia Gallagher, Vatican Issues Gay Policy Document, CNN.COM, Nov. 29, 2005, 
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/europe/11/29/vatican.gays/index.html?section=cnn_ 
latest. 
 181. See Chris Buell, U.S. Says Pope Immune From Clergy Abuse Lawsuit, JURIST, 
Sept. 20, 2005, http://jurist.law.pitt.edu/paperchase/2005/09/us-says-pope-immune-from-
clergy-abuse.php (noting that “[t]he instruction . . . is said to be part of an effort to protect 
the church from future sex abuse scandals”). 
 182. See, e.g., Gallagher, supra note 180 (noting that “gay groups have said the church 
is using homosexuals as scapegoats for its sexual abuse scandals”). 
 183. The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, Ministry to Persons with a 
Homosexual Inclination: Guidelines for Pastoral Care (November 14, 2006), available 
at http://www.usccb.org/dpp/Ministry.pdf. 
 184. Id. at 3. 
 185. Id. at 17. The Bishops nonetheless went on to state that Catholics should be mind-
ful of “such persons,” and church policies should “explicitly reject unjust discrimination 
and harassment of any persons, including those with a homosexual inclination.” Id. at 17–
18. 
 186. The United States Conference of Catholic Bishops, U.S. Bishops Vote Unani-
mously to Release Money for Research On Sexual Abuse by Clergy, November 13, 2006, 
http://www.usccb.org/comm/archives/2006/06-224.shtml. According to the Bishops’ 
Web site, the funding will cover three segments of a study undertaken by John Jay Col-
lege of Criminal Justice. Id. 
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their Charter for the Protection of Children and Young People.187 In the 
deeply apologetic preamble, the Bishops “express[ed] great sorrow and 
profound regret” in recognition of the “grave harm” that had been in-
flicted on minors.188 The Bishops also suggested that actions by local 
dioceses were necessary to “restore the bonds of trust.”189 
The actions that some dioceses have taken, however, are not necessar-
ily viewed as just in the eyes of sex abuse victims.190 For example, the 
church’s renewed effort to expel homosexuals from the ministry,191 re-
flected in the Instruction and taken in response to this crisis, is unlikely 
to make amends with those who have already suffered for decades as a 
result of ministerial indiscretions. “Twist of Faith,” a 2004 documentary 
film, chronicles a sex abuse victim’s struggle to procure an admission of 
responsibility from his local archdiocese.192 The victim, Tony Comes, 
suggested in an interview with Home Box Office, Inc. that he (and other 
victims) did not go public to get money, but rather for the truth.193 Bar-
ring homosexuals from the priesthood, it seems, is hardly an admission 
of guilt or an apology from the Holy See.194 And it is doubtful that the 
secrecy and silence that some archdioceses have employed in the United 
States with regard to sex abuse195 is the type of “action” called for by the 
Bishops in their 2006 Charter.196 
For the sex abuse victims who do seek pecuniary damages, there are 
other obstacles besides the evasiveness of the Catholic Church standing 
in the way of just compensation. For example, those who sue the alleged 
                                                                                                             
 187. CHARTER, supra note 1. 
 188. Id. 
 189. Id. 
 190. See, e.g., TWIST OF FAITH (Home Box Office, Inc. [HBO] Documentary Films 
2004) (chronicling the plight of a sex abuse plaintiff in search of not only damages, but 
an admission from the Catholic Church). See also infra text accompanying notes 192–93. 
 191. See supra text accompanying notes 178–79. 
 192. TWIST OF FAITH, supra note 190. 
 193. Interview with Tony Comes, HBO, http://www.hbo.com/docs/programs/ 
twistoffaith/interview_tonycomes.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). Comes “reluctantly” 
settled with the Catholic Diocese of Toledo for $55,000. TWIST OF FAITH, supra note 
190. 
 194. See Congregation, supra note 178. 
 195. See TWIST OF FAITH, supra note 190 (discussing the practice of clergy members 
invoking their “mental reservation” and lying to protect the Catholic Church from scan-
dal). See also New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia, Mental Reservation, http://www. 
newadvent.org/cathen/10195b.htm (last visited Mar. 13, 2008) (“According to the com-
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 196. CHARTER, supra note 1. 
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perpetrator (the priest himself) may find that he has taken a vow of pov-
erty,197 in which case he may be judgment-proof.198 Assuming those vic-
tims may then be inclined to direct their lawsuits at the archdiocese under 
the doctrine of respondeat superior, the issue of bankruptcy may come 
into play.199 Despite the argument that “[u]sing bankruptcy to limit a 
church’s responsibility to those who have been harmed would contradict 
the church’s own teachings,”200 several archdioceses have resorted to this 
very measure in response to the sex abuse lawsuits.201 As it can be argued 
that the vow of poverty serves as a policy justification for holding arch-
dioceses vicariously liable for their priests,202 it can also be said that 
piercing the sovereign veil of the Holy See is justifiable given that local 
archdioceses, from which the Holy See receives contributions, attempt to 
shield themselves from liability by filing for bankruptcy.203 
                                                                                                             
 197. New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia states:  
The vow of poverty may generally be defined as the promise made to God of a 
certain constant renunciation of temporal goods, in order to follow Christ. The 
object of the vow of poverty is anything visible, material, appreciable at a 
money value. Reputation, personal services, and the application of the mass, do 
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which contains them, and (at least in practice) manuscripts, as such, remain the 
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within its scope. A person who has made this vow gives up the right to acquire, 
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superior.  
New Advent Catholic Encyclopedia, Poverty, http://www.newadvent.org/cathen/12324a. 
htm (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). 
 198. See Michael J. Sartor, Respondeat Superior, Intentional Torts, and Clergy Sexual 
Misconduct: The Implications of Fearing v. Bucher, 62 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 687, 724 
(2005). 
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 200. Id. at 1197. 
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Davenport, Iowa. See Assoc’d Press, Iowa Catholic Diocese Files For Bankruptcy After 
Sex-Abuse Claims, FOX NEWS, Oct. 11, 2006, http://www.foxnews.com/story/0, 
2933,219741,00.html; Janet I. Tu, Spokane Diocese Files For Bankruptcy, SEATTLE 
TIMES, Dec. 7, 2004, available at http://seattletimes.nwsource.com/html/localnews/ 
2002111403_diocese07m.html. 
 202. Sartor, supra note 198, at 724 (noting that “[s]ome courts have acknowledged this 
policy consideration when evaluating respondeat superior claims arising out of sexual 
assaults perpetrated by clergy members who have taken the vow of poverty”). 
 203. But see Skeel, supra note 199, at 1198 (discussing potential benefits of bank-
ruptcy as a way of “coordinating the debtor’s response to a wave of litigation”). 
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If the Holy See is at all responsible for the horrific sex abuse epidemic 
in the United States, as Doe v. Holy See suggests with uncontroverted 
facts, the FSIA tort exception can serve as a mechanism for victims who 
try in vain to seek justice at home. This is something Congress must ad-
dress, either by amendment or at least a clear cut statement of intent, 
given that this type of scandal was not likely in mind when it enacted the 
FSIA. At that time, the Holy See was not yet deemed a foreign sovereign 
by the United States.204 Further, the wave of litigation involving clergy 
sex abuse, particularly that which actually implicated the Holy See, did 
not surface until the late 1980s.205 Therefore, it would be appropriate for 
Congress to reexamine the terms of the tort exception and enact language 
to clarify the provision. One option would be to simply incorporate the 
House Report language into the statute and require the entire tort, includ-
ing act or omission, to occur in the United States.206 As a matter of pol-
icy, however, such a restriction would be damaging to the interests of sex 
abuse victims that have been wronged by the Holy See’s negligence oc-
curring in Rome, especially if local dioceses continue to seek bankruptcy 
in lieu of settlement.207 
Another possibility for the legislature is the Working Group’s sugges-
tion that a “substantial portion” of the tortious conduct occur in the 
United States.208 This measure would at least give courts some license to 
exercise jurisdiction over the foreign sovereign in difficult multi-country 
scenarios like that of Doe v. Holy See.209 The Working Group conceded, 
however, that “substantial” is a rather vague term.210 Considering the 
decision in Doe v. Holy See, and the near certainty that more plaintiffs 
will seek retribution from the Holy See in the future given the Oregon 
District Court’s ruling, vague terminology will not assist courts any more 
than the inconsistent interpretations of the FSIA, judicial or otherwise.211 
Who is to say, for example, that the Holy See’s conduct in Oregon (as-
suming any of its conduct actually occurred there) played a “substantial” 
                                                                                                             
 204. It was not so deemed until 1984. O’Bryan I, 490 F. Supp. 2d 826, 829 (W.D. Ky. 
2005). 
 205. See supra note 147. 
 206. H.R. Rep. No. 94-1487, at 21 (1976). 
 207. See supra text accompanying notes 197–203. 
 208. Working Group, supra note 28, at 568. 
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2008] CALL FOR REFORM: SEX ABUSE & THE FSIA 681 
role in Ronan’s abuse of Doe? The answer is a judge, and judges may 
very well differ on what constitutes “substantial.” 
The fact of the matter is that Congress intended the FSIA to serve the 
interests of foreign states and U.S. litigants alike.212 Its language should 
not be subject to interpretation that sacrifices the interests of one for the 
other simply because a foreign state’s misconduct occurs wholly or par-
tially outside the United States.213 To prevent this from happening, Con-
gress should ratify the Oregon District Court’s decision, based on the 
Ninth Circuit’s “middle ground” interpretation,214 to prevent foreign 
states like the Holy See from escaping liability for conduct that severely 
affects U.S. litigants. Therefore, to avoid confusion, Congress should 
adopt language more closely aligned to the Restatement of Foreign Rela-
tions Law commentary215 and the FSIA commercial activity exception.216 
For example: 
A foreign state shall not be immune from the jurisdiction of the courts 
of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in which money 
damages are sought against a foreign state for personal injury or death  
. . . occurring in the United States and caused by the tortious act or 
omission of that foreign state and that act causes a direct effect in the 
United States. . .217 
Additionally, in case of lingering confusion, Congress could clarify, as 
the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law did, that the tort exception 
does not apply to “indirect” torts, such as loss of consortium, where the 
injury occurs abroad.218 
                                                                                                             
 212. 28 U.S.C. § 1602 (1976). Further, as the Ninth Circuit stated, the forum state “has 
strong interests in protecting its residents from injury and in furnishing a forum where 
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 213. See, e.g., English v. Thorne, 676 F. Supp. 761, 764 (S.D. Miss. 1987). 
 214. Doe v. Holy See, 434 F. Supp. 2d 925, 951 (D. Or. 2006). 
 215. See supra note 64 and accompanying text. 
 216. See supra note 35 and accompanying text. 
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Another possibility, and a timely one in light of the O’Bryan II opin-
ion,219 would be for the FSIA to incorporate a definition of what consti-
tutes an “official” or “employee.”220 Given that these definitions remain a 
matter of state law,221 there is still room for inconsistency among the 
courts’ opinions regarding Roman Catholic officials, such as priests and 
bishops. If these positions fell within a uniform definition of “employee,” 
plaintiffs would be almost guaranteed some recourse against the Holy 
See, if not for its own actions, but for the actions of its officials under the 
doctrine of respondeat superior.222 A uniform definition of terms of this 
kind would help serve the interests of justice in addition to creating more 
uniformity among courts’ decisions involving the Holy See and its agents 
in general. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion, a “crisis without precedent” that may be caused in part 
by the acts of a foreign state merits consistent treatment in U.S. courts,223 
particularly where such acts or omissions are difficult to pinpoint.224 If 
Doe v. Holy See remains good law,225 as Olsen did in the Ninth Cir-
cuit,226 judges should be at liberty to follow it without having to embark 
on a confusing analysis of Congressional intent that was never truly en-
acted in the FSIA.227 Given the vast impact of the clergy sex abuse scan-
dal in recent history228 and the fact that not all plaintiffs can procure ade-
quate compensation at home,229 the FSIA should not prevent litigation 
against the Holy See in cases where the factual allegations sufficiently 
demonstrate liability. This principle should hold true irrespective of the 
territory in which the tortious harm occurred. 
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In light of the foregoing, Congress must amend the FSIA to facilitate 
uniform interpretation among courts, and more importantly, to allow vic-
tims of clergy sex abuse to obtain the recourse they deserve. Revising the 
language of the tort exception to be less restrictive in terms of territory is 
one option. Another option would be addressing the question of what 
constitutes an “official” or “employee” of the Holy See given that these 
terms remain undefined in the FSIA.230 It would better serve the interests 
of justice, as the FSIA purports to do,231 for plaintiffs at the very least to 
pierce the sovereignty of the Holy See through the acts of its agents at 
home. 
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